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We study optimal monetary policy in the presence of ﬁnancial sta-
bility concerns. We build a model in which monetary easing can lower
the cost of capital for ﬁrms and restore the natural level of investment,
but does also subsidize ineﬃcient maturity transformation by ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries in the form of “carry trades” that borrow cheap
at the short-term against illiquid long-term assets. Carry trades not
only lead to ﬁnancial instability in the form of rollover risk, but also
crowd out real investment since intermediaries equate the marginal
return on lending to ﬁrms to that on carry trades. Optimal monetary
policy trades oﬀ any stimulative gains against these costs of carry
trades. The model provides a framework to understand the puzzling
phenomenon that the unprecedented post-2008 monetary easing has
been associated with below-trend real investment, even while returns
to real and ﬁnancial capital have been historically high.
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“In the absence of economic rents, the return on corporate capital should
generally follow the path of interest rates, which reﬂect the prevailing return
to capital in the economy. But over the past three decades, the return to
productive capital generally has risen, despite the large decline in yields on
government bonds.” – Jason Furman, Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, United States, in “Productivity, Inequality and Economic Rents,”
June 13, 2016.
Introduction
Motivation
Since the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-08, central banks in the Western
economies have embarked upon the so-called unconventional monetary poli-
cies. These policies feature monetary easing aimed at keeping interest rates
at ultra-low levels. Most notably, the Federal Reserve has kept interest rates
at the zero lower-bound with large-scale asset purchases of Treasuries and
mortgage-backed securities. European Central Bank has now followed suit
with such purchases and so has the Bank of Japan. The objective of such
aggressive easing has been to restore some of the abrupt and massive loss
in aggregate demand that followed the crisis by lowering the cost of capital
for the real sector with the objective of stimulating investment and credit to
“normal” levels.1
1This lowering of the cost of capital can arise, for instance, due to a reduction in
the liquidity premium in markets, that in turn, enables cheaper leveraged ﬁnancing of
investments (Drechsler et al. 2016). Increase in investment can also arise because a lower
real rate mitigates agency-driven ﬁnancial constraints (Farhi and Tirole, 2012).
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Several academics and policy-makers have highlighted, however, that such
monetary policies have had unintended consequences that have limited the
eﬀectiveness of the policies in achieving the intended goals. In particular,
they have highlighted the “search for yield” among institutional investors
and the resulting sharp asset-price inﬂation in certain risky asset classes
(e.g., high-yield corporate bonds, emerging-market debt and equities) that
did not induce signiﬁcant real investments by the issuing entities.2 Others,
notably Furman (2015, 2016) (see the introductory quote), have argued that
coincident with low rates has been a high marginal return to capital, low
ﬁxed real investment, and high returns to shareholder capital in the form of
share buy-backs. Indeed, if extended periods of low rates were successful at
restoring investment, the marginal return on capital would end up low and
ﬁxed real investment high. Furman considers this an important puzzle facing
economic theory and the practice of monetary policy.
One way of understanding these consequences in a uniﬁed way is that
keeping interest rates low allows ﬁnancial institutions to fund long-term as-
sets with relatively short-term claims, hoping that these claims can be reﬁ-
nanced until the long-term assets mature, resulting in a “carry.” A potential
2See, in particular, Rajan (2013): “If eﬀective, the combination of the “low for long”
policy for short term policy rates coupled with quantitative easing tends to depress yields.
. . . Fixed income investors with minimum nominal return needs then migrate to riskier
instruments such as junk bonds, emerging market bonds, or commodity ETFs. . . . [T]his
reach for yield is precisely one of the intended consequences of unconventional monetary
policy. The hope is that as the price of risk is reduced, corporations faced with a lower
cost of capital will have greater incentive to make real investments, thereby creating jobs
and enhancing growth. . . . There are two ways these calculations can go wrong. First,
ﬁnancial risk taking may stay just that, without translating into real investment. For
instance, the price of junk debt or homes may be bid up unduly, increasing the risk of
a crash, without new capital goods being bought or homes being built. . . . Second, and
probably a lesser worry, accommodative policies may reduce the cost of capital for ﬁrms
so much that they prefer labor-saving capital investment to hiring labor.”
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rollover risk arises with such carry trades when the availability of future
funding liquidity is uncertain, and early liquidation of the long-term assets
backing the trades is costly and ineﬃcient. In this case, the maturity trans-
formation that monetary easing induces in the ﬁnancial sector creates private
gains in the sector—resulting from transfers from savers to borrowers—but
also results in expected social costs in the form of ineﬃcient liquidations of
long-term assets when this rollover risk materializes.
For instance, when the “taper” of its expansionary monetary policy was
announced by the Federal Reserve in May 2013, several emerging market
debt securities experienced liquidations by foreign institutional investors,
causing severe price volatility in their debt markets as well as in the cur-
rency exchange rates.3 The “taper tantrum” required massive interventions
by emerging market central banks and was ultimately calmed down only
when the Federal Reserve indicated a few months later that it would not in
fact taper as quickly as it might have suggested in May 2013. Recently, as
the Federal Reserve appears to be moving closer to “up-lift” of the rates,
similar liquidation concerns have been raised about. In particular, there is
the mention of “illusory liquidity” that the ﬁnancial sector has been relying
on for funding of positions in high-yield corporate debt, structured products,
and emerging market debt and equities, and that this liquidity may vanish
3See Feroli et al.(2014), who document that Emerging Market Bond Funds had started
receiving steady inﬂows since 2009, with a peak of around $3.5 bln per month that
promptly reversed to outﬂows of similar magnitude in the months immediately after the
“taper” announcement. See also the discussion of Feroli et al. by Stein (2014). IMF (2014)
documents that the composition of ﬂows tilted from the pre-2009 50:50 between developed
and emerging markets to post-2008 80:20 in favor of emerging markets. However, the net
monthly outﬂow during June-Aug 2013 after the taper announcement represented a three
to six standard deviation shock for the emerging markets.
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with the up-lift.
When monetary easing is suﬃciently aggressive that it generates excess
returns on carry trades despite such transformation risk, ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries allocate economy’s savings away from real investment into carry trades
until the marginal return on investment rises to compensate for the opportu-
nity cost of the carry. In other words, low interest rates induce carry trades
that crowd out real-sector investment. This leads to the coincidence of low
rates with high marginal return on real capital, low real investment, and high
shareholder return on capital (due to paying out of the carry), as documented
in Furman (2015, 2016).
Furthermore, monetary easing translates into lower rates for corporate
borrowing until it is suﬃciently aggressive that carry trades become prof-
itable. At interest rates below a critical rate, the transmission channel of
monetary policy breaks down; in fact, as carry trade returns increase with
further easing, a lower interest rate leads to a higher corporate cost of bor-
rowing, an important manifestation of the crowding-out eﬀect.
Model
We capture these economic insights in a simple and tractable model that
integrates the standard rationale for monetary easing with the ﬁnancial in-
stability risk and crowding-out of real investment that arise from carry trades.
Our modelling strategy is as follows. In the workhorse new Keynesian
model, optimal monetary policy reaches two simultaneous goals, anchoring
inﬂation expectations and setting the real interest rate at the natural level
that would prevail under ﬂexible prices. Adding the possibility of ineﬃcient
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carry trades discussed above in this workhorse model raises signiﬁcant mod-
elling challenges. This requires the introduction of assets of varying maturity
and liquidity, heterogeneous agents (so that carry traders ﬁnd counterparts),
and imperfect liquidity in ﬁnancial markets.
Our strategy is to introduce these ingredients in a simple model of optimal
monetary policy that focusses on the steering of the real rate by the central
bank while abstracting from price-level determination. Following Benmelech
and Bergman (2012) or Farhi and Tirole (2012), we simply assume that
the public sector controls the real interest rate. We study an economy in
which households ﬁnd two goods desirable, a nume´raire good and the output
produced by an interest-sensitive sector. We suppose that goods prices are
too rigid to track the evolution of households’ marginal rate of substitution.
In the case of temporary positive preference shocks for the output, monetary
easing — by temporarily lowering the interest rate — spurs investment by
the interest-sensitive sector and can restore the ﬁrst-best allocation despite
incorrect price signals.
This model of optimal monetary easing is suﬃciently tractable that it
lends itself to the addition of the ingredients needed to study ﬁnancial in-
stability risk. We proceed by supposing that ﬁnancial intermediaries are in
charge of collecting the short-term resources that fund productive investment
by the interest-sensitive sector. These ﬁnancial intermediaries can direct
these resources towards an alternative use, however. They can buy outstand-
ing long-term cash ﬂows from long-term investors, rolling over short-term
debt until these cash ﬂows pay oﬀ. Maturity transformation in the form of
such “carry trades” is privately beneﬁcial but socially costly. It implements
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a transfer from households to borrowing ﬁnancial institutions at the social
cost of ineﬃcient early liquidation of long-term assets when rollover risk ma-
terializes. If, in addition, the supply of long-term assets is suﬃciently large
that ﬁnancial intermediaries extract rents from carry trades, then this raises
the opportunity cost of productive investment and crowds it out.
Our main result is that when the stimulative gains from monetary policy
are weak and the potential for ﬁnancial carry trades large, optimal monetary
policy should “lean against the wind” by tightening suﬃciently that the
return on carry trades no longer compensates for the associated rollover risk.4
Interestingly and importantly, such a tightening not only discourages carry
trades, but also spurs productive investment as this reduces the crowding-out
eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the related literature
and our contributions relative to it. Section 2 presents the benchmark model
of optimal monetary easing. Section 3 introduces ﬁnancial intermediaries and
derives (i) the carry-trade incentives at the optimal rate in the benchmark
model, (ii) implications of the carry trades, and, (iii) the optimal monetary
policy taking account of carry trades by the ﬁnancial sector. Section 4 ex-
tends the model to a lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) policy, so that the central
bank sets the ex-ante policy rate as well as the ex-post LOLR rate when
rollover risk materializes, and also discusses implications for quantitative
4While our motivation focused on the more recent monetary easing, the ﬁnancial
instability risk we highlight has manifested itself also in the past episodes of mone-
tary easing in the form of destabilization of long-term government bond markets (see
http://fortune.com/2013/02/03/the-great-bond-massacre-fortune-1994/) and the materi-
alization of rollover risk in mortgage-related maturity transformation by the ﬁnancial
sector during the subprime crisis.
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easing programs. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
1 Related literature
It is interesting to contrast the role of monetary easing in creating ﬁnancial
instability in our model with that in recent related contributions. In Farhi
and Tirole (2012), the central bank faces a commitment problem which is
that it cannot commit not to lower interest rates when ﬁnancial sector’s ma-
turity transformation goes awry. In anticipation, the ﬁnancial sector ﬁnds it
optimal to engage in maturity transformation to exploit the central bank’s
“put.” In Diamond and Rajan (2012), the rollover risk in short-term claims
disciplines banks from excessive maturity transformation, but the inability
of the central bank to commit to “bailing out” short-term claims removes the
market discipline, inducing excessive illiquidity-seeking by banks. They too
propose raising rates in good times taking account of ﬁnancial stability con-
cerns, but so as to avoid distortions from having to raise rates when banks are
distressed. In contrast to these papers, in our model the central bank faces
no commitment problem; it ﬁnds low rates attractive up to a point for stim-
ulating productive investment but lowering rates beyond triggers ineﬃcient
maturity transformation in the ﬁnancial sector and crowds out productive
real investment.
Acharya and Naqvi (2012a, b) develop a model of internal agency prob-
lem in ﬁnancial ﬁrms due to limited liability wherein liquidity shortfalls on
maturity transformation serve to align insiders’ incentives with those of out-
siders. When aggregate liquidity at rollover date is abundant, such align-
8
ment is restricted accentuating agency conﬂicts, leading to excessive lending
and fueling of asset-price bubbles. Easy monetary policy only exacerbates
this problem. Stein (2012) explains that prudential regulation of banks can
partly rein in incentives to engage in maturity transformation that is so-
cially suboptimal due to ﬁre-sale externalities; however, there is always some
unchecked growth of such activity in shadow banking and monetary policy
that leans against the wind can be optimal as it raises the cost of borrowing
in all “cracks” of the ﬁnancial sector (this is indeed our model’s insight too).
The key diﬀerence between our model and these two papers is that exces-
sive maturity transformation arises in our model not due to agency problems
in the ﬁnancial sector nor due to ﬁre-sale externalities, but from excessive
monetary easing aimed at stimulating aggregate output.5 Brunnermeier and
Koby (2016) show, like us, that monetary easing can lead to a contraction
in lending. Whereas this stems from heightened incentives to ﬁnance ineﬃ-
cient speculation in our setup, this stems from eroded lending margins in an
environment of imperfectly competitive banks in theirs.
As we set up the modeling ingredients and extensions in the paper, we
relate our modeling of (i) the public sector controlling the real interest rate
to recent papers making a similar assumption (e.g., Benmelech and Bergman
2012, or Farhi and Tirole 2012); and, (ii) the public sector’s crowding out
of carry trades and short-term deposits of the ﬁnancial sector through asset
purchases, as in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015), Caballero and
Farhi (2016), and Greenwood, Hansen and Stein (2016).
5Acharya (2015) proposes a leaning-against-the-wind interest-rate policy in good times
for a central bank to reduce the extent of political interference that can arise in attempting
to deal with quasi-ﬁscal actions during a ﬁnancial crisis.
9
Finally, the empirical literature supporting some of our model’s implica-
tions and economic forces is discussed in Section 3.3.
2 An elementary model of monetary easing
2.1 Setup
Time is discrete. There are two classes of agents: households and the public
sector. Households are of two types, savers and entrepreneurs, that share
similar preferences but diﬀer along their endowments. There are two goods
that households ﬁnd desirable: a nume´raire good and entrepreneurs’ output.
Households’ preferences. At each date, a mass 2 of households are
born and live for two dates. Each cohort is equally split into savers and en-
trepreneurs. Both types of households derive utility from consumption only
when old. Entrepreneurs’ output and the nume´raire good are perfect substi-
tutes for them, although an entrepreneur cannot consume his own output.
Households are risk neutral over consumption.
Households’ endowments. Each saver receives an endowment of y
units of the nume´raire good at birth, where y > 0. Each entrepreneur born
at date t is endowed with a technology that transforms an investment of I
units of the nume´raire good at date t into f(I) units of output at date t+1.
The function f satisﬁes the Inada conditions and is such that
f ′(y) < 1. (1)
Public sector. The public sector does not consume and maximizes total
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households’ utility, discounting that of future generations with a factor arbi-
trarily close to 1. At each date, the public sector matches net bond issuances
described below with lump sum rebates/taxes to current old households.
Bond markets. There are two markets for one-period risk-free bonds
denominated in the nume´raire good. The public sector and savers trade in
the public-bond market. Savers and entrepreneurs trade in the corporate-
bond market. Note that this implies in particular that the public sector
cannot lend to entrepreneurs.6
Monetary policy. The public sector announces at each date an interest
rate at which it is willing to meet any (net) demand for public bonds by
savers.
Finally, households are price-takers in goods and bonds markets.
Relationship to new Keynesian models
This setup can be described as a much simpliﬁed version of a new Keynesian
model in which money serves only as a unit of account (“cashless economy”)
and monetary policy consists in enforcing the short-term nominal interest
rate. Such monetary policy has real eﬀects in the presence of nominal rigidi-
ties. We entirely focus on these real eﬀects, and fully abstract from price-level
determination by assuming extreme nominal rigidities in the form of a ﬁxed
price level for one good that we therefore deem the nume´raire good. This
simple real model enables us to study ineﬃcient speculation in Sections 3 and
4 in a tractable framework. In the online appendix, we sketch a nominal ver-
6Note also that restricting corporate securities to risk-free bonds is only to ﬁx ideas.
This comes at no loss of generality given that production is deterministic and entrepreneurs
face no ﬁnancial frictions.
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sion of the model with endogenous price level. The public sector determines
both the price level using an interest-feedback rule, and the real interest rate
using an appropriate mix of open-market operations and taxes similar to that
described above.
2.2 Steady-state
We study steady-states in which the public sector announces a constant in-
terest rate r > f ′(y), and the price of ﬁrms’ output (in terms of the nume´raire
good) is at its equilibrium level of one.
The structure of the model lends itself to simple analysis. Savers need to
store their endowment for consumption. They have access to two risk-free
stores of value, public and corporate bonds. Equilibrium therefore requires
that the return on corporate bonds is equal to that announced by the public
sector on public bonds, r. At such a rate r, entrepreneurs optimally invest I
such that
f ′(I) = r, (2)
and make a net proﬁt
f(I)− rI. (3)
Savers invest I in corporate bonds and y − I in public bonds. At each date,
current old households receive a lump sum from the government equal to the
net issuance (1 − r)(y − I). The utility of a generic cohort of households is
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therefore equal to
rI︸︷︷︸
Savers’ return on corporate bonds
+ r(y − I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Savers’ return on public bonds
+ f(I)− rI︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entrepreneurs’ proﬁts
+ (1− r)(y − I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rebated public surplus
= f(I)− I + y, (4)
maximized at
f ′(I∗) = r∗ = 1. (5)
In this elementary environment, condition (5) rephrases the standard “golden
rule” according to which steady-state consumption is maximum when the
return on capital equates the growth rate of the economy (zero here). Net
public debt issuance is zero at each date at this optimal unit interest rate.
2.3 Monetary easing
Suppose now that one cohort of households — the one born at date 0, say —
do not have the same preferences as that of their predecessors and successors.
Unlike the other cohorts, they value the consumption of one unit of output
at date 1 as much as that of 1/ρ units of nume´raire, where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is such
that f ′(y) < ρ.7 We ﬁrst check that, unsurprisingly, this preference shock
does not aﬀect the optimal policy rate when the output price is ﬂexible. We
7Note that whether this shock and the associated policy response are anticipated or
not by the predecessors of the date-0 cohort is immaterial because this does not aﬀect
their investment decisions given the assumed environment.
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then introduce price rigidity.
Flexible price benchmark
When the output price is ﬂexible, the steady-state unit interest rate is still
optimal at all dates in the presence of such time-varying preferences. The
date-1 market-clearing price of the output (in terms of the nume´raire good) is
1/ρ, whereas it remains equal to one at every other date. At this date-1 price,
the steady-state unit interest rate leads to a date-0 corporate borrowing I0
such that
f ′(I0)
ρ
= 1, (6)
that exceeds the level I∗ prevailing at other dates. The objective of the public
sector is reached at this unit rate because production is eﬃcient at each date.
The exceptionally high date-0 productive investment level I0 > I
∗ has re-
distributive consequences across cohorts that are immaterial given the public
sector’s objective. At date 0, the public sector faces a bond payment of y−I∗
to the date-(−1) cohort but raises only y−I0 from the date-0 cohort. It there-
fore must collect a lump sum tax I0− I∗ from old date-(−1) households.8 At
date 1, the public sector repays only ρ(y − I0) to the date-0 cohort whereas
it collects y − I∗ from the date-1 cohort. Overall, the utility of the date-0
8Recall our convention that households are taxed when old only.
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cohort is:
f(I0)
ρ
− ρI0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entrepreneurs’ proﬁts
+ ρ(y − I0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Public bonds return
+ ρI0︸︷︷︸
Private bonds return
+ y − I∗ − ρ(y − I0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Date-1 public rebate
=
f(I0)
ρ
− I0 + y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus created by the date-0 cohort
+ I0 − I∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Subsidy from other cohorts
. (7)
The subsidy from other cohorts I0 − I∗ matches the tax paid by the
date-(−1) cohort at date 0.
Nominal rigidities and optimal monetary policy
We now create room for monetary easing at date 0 by introducing price
rigidities:
Assumption. (Sluggish output price) The output price remains constant
at all dates at its steady-state level of one.
In other words, we suppose that the price system is too rigid to track
the exceptional and transitory preference shock that hits the date-0 cohort.9
With sticky output price, the public sector can make up for the absence of
appropriate price signals in the date-1 output market by distorting the date-0
capital market. Suppose to ﬁx ideas that savers have absolute priority over
entrepreneurs when the output good is rationed, and that y is suﬃciently
large that they consume the entire output.10 Monetary easing in the form
of an interest rate equal to ρ between dates 0 and 1 boosts date-0 produc-
tive investment to the optimal level I0 because optimal date-0 investment
9We could also assume a partial price adjustment without aﬀecting the analysis.
10Alternative rationing rules would not qualitatively aﬀect the analysis.
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by entrepreneurs then derives from the very same equation (6). The only
diﬀerence with the case of ﬂexible prices is that date-0 entrepreneurs’ proﬁt
is reduced to f(I0) − ρI0 because the consumers of their output extract a
surplus (1/ρ)f(I0)− f(I0) given the unit output price.
Proposition 1. (Monetary easing) Setting the interest rate at ρ at date
0 and at one at other dates implements the ﬂexible-price outputs and is there-
fore optimal.
Proof. See discussion above. 
More on the relationship to new Keynesian models
In the workhorse new Keynesian framework, monetary policy serves both to
pin down inﬂation and to set the real interest rate at the “natural” level that
would prevail under ﬂexible prices. Whereas we abstract from price-level
determination, monetary policy in our framework plays the very same latter
role of mitigating distortions induced by nominal rigidities. In our setup in
which agents consume at one date only, there is no such thing as a natural
intertemporal rate of substitution, and monetary policy tracks instead its
equivalent here, the natural marginal rate of substitution between the output
and the nume´raire good.
The preference shock ρ < 1 at date 0 introduces a simple motive for mon-
etary easing, equivalent to the exogenous temporary increase in households’
desire to save introduced in the new Keynesian models that study deﬂation
risk (see, e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford 2003, or Wiederholt 2015). For
a concrete interpretation of this shock, one can view the entrepreneurs as
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representing the most interest-sensitive sectors of the economy, such as con-
struction and other durable goods manufacturers. Accordingly, the date-0
preference shock captures in a ﬁxed-price environment the idea that durable
prices would be relatively more aﬀected in a deﬂationary episode and thus
relatively more mispriced, as seems to be empirically the case (see Klenow
and Malin 2011).
It is worthwhile stressing that nominal rigidities in our model create mis-
pricing and market disequilibrium that are very short-lived: They last for one
date only (date 1). We show in the following section that the corresponding
monetary response can be conducive to ﬁnancial instability for several pe-
riods down the road. This occurs if the public sector does not control the
amount of maturity transformation implemented by the ﬁnancial sector.
3 Monetary policy and ﬁnancial instability
We now introduce a ﬁnancial sector in this economy. The ﬁnancial sector
is comprised of two types of agents, banks and long-term investors. Both
banks and LT investors are risk-neutral over consumption at each date. They
discount future consumption using the same discount factor as that of the
public sector. (Recall this discount factor is arbitrarily close to 1). Banks
and LT investors play the following respective roles in the economy.
Banks. We shut down the corporate-bond market and suppose in-
stead that the ﬁnancing of entrepreneurs by savers must be intermediated by
banks. To ﬁx ideas, we suppose that savers are competitive in the market
for deposits—one-period risk-free bonds issued by banks, and that banks are
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competitive in the market for loans—one-period risk-free bonds issued by en-
trepreneurs. Savers still have direct access to government bonds. Following
Diamond (1997), we model liquidity risk for banks as a simple form of mar-
ket incompleteness. We suppose that each bank can participate in markets
with probability 1 − q only at each date, where q ∈ (0, 1). Penalties from
defaulting on deposits are so large that banks never ﬁnd it optimal to do so.
LT investors. At date 0, LT investors hold claims to an asset that pays
oﬀ A ≥ 0 at a random future date with arrival probability p ∈ (0, 1).11 All
or part of the asset can also be liquidated before this accrual date at a linear
cost: It is possible to generate cash at the current date at the cost of giving
up 1 + λ units at the accrual date for each currently generated unit, where
λ ≥ 0. LT investors cannot trade directly with households but can do so
with banks. These long-term claims held by LT investors could be modelled
as long-term public debt issued in the past, as rents paid by entrepreneurs
to use a ﬁxed factor of production owned by LT investors (e.g., land), or as
rents that would be paid by the producers of the nume´raire good if we were
explicitly modelling its production. The nature of this claim is irrelevant.
All that matters is that LT investors hold a long-term claim to consumption.
Finally, we suppose that banks’ exclusions from markets are not perfectly
correlated across banks, and that the exclusion dates are independent from
the asset’s payoﬀ date.
The model studied in Section 2 can be viewed as the particular case in
which A = 0 so that LT investors are immaterial. In this case, banks cannot
11This speciﬁcation of a payoﬀ date arriving at a constant rate is meant to obtain
a simple time-homogeneous problem. All that matters is that the asset is long term
(p < 1). We could also introduce heterogeneous assets of varying maturities without
gaining signiﬁcant insights.
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remunerate deposits below the return on public bonds and entrepreneurs can-
not borrow below the deposit rate. Banks’ assets and liabilities therefore all
earn the policy rate at all dates, banks make zero proﬁt and are immaterial.
3.1 Ineﬃcient carry trades
The ﬁnancial sector becomes relevant when A > 0. We focus on the most
interesting case in which
A ≥ y. (8)
Monetary easing at date 0 in the form of a policy rate equal to ρ between
dates 0 and 1 opens up potential gains from trade between banks and LT
investors. Banks have access to funds at a lower cost than the ﬁnancial
sector’s discount factor, and LT investors own claims to future consumption
against which it is possible to borrow. Thus banks can enter into proﬁtable
carry trades by buying assets from LT investors, ﬁnancing their acquisitions
by rolling over short-term debt until the accrual date, at which the asset
pays oﬀ and the trade is unwound. Such carry trades involve risky maturity
transformation. If a bank is excluded from markets before the asset pays oﬀ,
then it must liquidate its LT assets in order to honor outstanding deposits.
This illiquidity risk reduces the appeal of carry trades.
Condition (8) describes an economy in which the pool of LT assets that
can be reﬁnanced by rolling over short-term debt this way is very large.
As detailed in Section 3.3, we ﬁnd this condition to be consistent with the
fact that maturity and liquidity transformation are now pervasive in the
19
ﬁnancial system, and performed by many institutions that are not subject to
prudential regulation.
To ﬁx ideas, we suppose that banks extract all the gains from such carry
trades with LT investors: A long-term claim to one unit of future consump-
tion trades at a price of one between banks and LT investors at date 0.12 This
is only for expositional simplicity. As detailed in Section 3.2, our results rely
only on the assumption that banks extract at least some surplus from carry
trades. Note that this assumption that LT assets trade in a buyer’s market
is consistent with condition (8) which states that there is excess supply in
the market for LT assets.
Formally, suppose that a bank ﬁnances the purchase of a claim to a unit
payoﬀ from LT investors with the issuance of a unit deposit at date 0. The
expected value of the associated liability is then:
ρ
∑
k≥1
(1− q)k−1(1− p)k−1[p+ (1− p)q(1 + λ)] = ρ(1 + Λ), (9)
where
Λ =
λ
1 + p
(1−p)q
. (10)
Expression (9) states that the bank rolls over the unit deposit until the ﬁrst
of two events occurs: the accrual date or an exclusion date. The latter event
entails early liquidation of LT assets.13
12The online appendix discusses more general surplus sharing between banks and LT
investors.
13For simplicity, we suppose that banks have an initial endowment in LT assets against
which they do not ﬁnd desirable to borrow but that they can liquidate together with
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The parameter Λ deﬁned in (10) is increasing in λ, 1− p, and q. It thus
measures the overall magnitude of the transformation risk induced by carry
trades.
If ρ(1 + Λ) ≥ 1, then the carry trade is not proﬁtable. LT investors hold
on to their assets, and banks intermediate between savers and entrepreneurs
the optimal investment I0 at date 0 making zero proﬁt.
Conversely, if ρ(1+Λ) < 1, then banks have two valuable alternative uses
of deposits. They may either lend to entrepreneurs, or engage in carry trades.
The marginal return on carry trades is one minus the expected cost of failure
to roll over ρΛ. In equilibrium, the marginal return on loans to entrepreneurs
must equate it. This implies that banks attract the entire date-0 savers’ in-
come y and split their investments into an aggregate lending to entrepreneurs
I∗∗ and a carry trade of size y− I∗∗, where I∗∗ is the entrepreneurs’ demand
for funds when the cost of funds is 1− ρΛ:
f ′(I∗∗) = 1− ρΛ. (11)
In other words, banks earn a ﬁxed return of 1 − ρΛ on carry trades when
borrowing at the rate ρ; thus, they lend to entrepreneurs at the same rate
1 − ρΛ, that pins down the demand of capital by the entrepreneurs. Note
that banks, unless excluded from markets, have enough funds to both lend
I∗ to entrepreneurs and reﬁnance the carry trade y − I∗∗ at all t ≥ 1.14
The following proposition summarizes these results.
the assets bought from LT investors when excluded from markets. This way they never
default.
14This stems from ρ(y − I∗∗) < y − I∗ since I∗∗ > I∗.
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Proposition 2. (Monetary easing and ineﬃcient carry trades) If
ρ(1+Λ) ≥ 1, then banks do not enter into carry trades at date 0. They make
zero proﬁt and channel I0 towards entrepreneurs at date 0.
Otherwise, entrepreneurs invest only I∗∗ such that I∗ < I∗∗ < I0. Banks
use the residual date-0 savings y − I∗∗ to enter into carry trades at date 0,
where f ′(I∗∗) = 1 − ρΛ. In particular, the public sector has no resources at
date 0.
Proof. See discussion above. 
This setup captures the idea that imposing an unusually low interest rate
creates room for socially ineﬃcient carry trades. Carry trades are socially
ineﬃcient for two reasons: they create ﬁnancial instability and they crowd
out productive investment.
• Financial instability. The return on carry trade 1 − ρ(1 + Λ) can be
decomposed in two parts, a “carry” 1 − ρ and an expected cost of ﬁ-
nancial distress −ρΛ. The carry is a wash for social surplus as it is
only a transfer from households to banks via the diversion of govern-
ment surplus.15 On the other hand, the expected cost of the liquidity
crises created down the road by maturity transformation is a social
deadweight loss. In other words, banks extract rents at the social cost
of ﬁnancial instability.
• Crowding out of productive investment. The additional social cost of
carry trades is that carry-trade returns raise the hurdle rate for loans to
entrepreneurs, thereby leading to a suboptimally low level of produc-
15Absent carry trades, the government rebates the carry 1− ρ to households.
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tive investment. Note that this second source of ineﬃciency prevails
only if the wealth to income ratio A/y of the economy is suﬃciently
large, as is the case under condition (8), so that the marginal deposit
has two alternative uses in equilibrium, either carry trades or loans to
entrepreneurs. A suﬃciently small supply of assets against which banks
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to rollover deposits would imply that the hurdle rate
on loans would be ρ.
3.2 Robustness
Alternative surplus-sharing rules
Three simple assumptions about the sharing of gains from trade between
the diﬀerent types of agents ease the exposition: i) savers are kept at their
reservation utility by banks in the deposit market; ii) LT investors are kept at
their reservation utility by banks in the market for LT assets; and iii) banks
are kept at their reservation utility by entrepreneurs in the loan market. All
that is needed to obtain our qualitative results—in particular, the crowding
out of productive investment by carry trades—is much more parsimonious,
however. It suﬃces that banks or/and date-0 depositors extract some surplus
from carry trades. As soon as banks extract some surplus, then this raises
their opportunity cost of loans to entrepreneurs, thereby reducing lending
activity as shown above. If competition for deposits leads banks to raise
deposit rates up to the point at which they pass on all their surplus from
carry trades to depositors, then there is still crowding out: The higher hurdle
rate on loans stems in this case from the higher deposit rates.
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Again, this important assumption that LT investors do not achieve full
surplus extraction from carry trades is in line with the assumption that there
are many LT assets up for sale relative to date-0 investable funds.
Liquidity risk management in an interbank market
The assumption that banks lose all access to funds when excluded from the
market simpliﬁes the analysis but is rather strong. We could alternatively
assume that banks may randomly lose direct access to retail deposits, but
that they could still gain indirect access to funding via other banks in an
interbank market, albeit at some cost. This way, banks would be able to
insure each other against liquidity risk. Because this risk is the only force that
reduces their incentives to enter into carry trades, the crowding-out eﬀect of
carry trades would be even stronger under this milder assumption. More
generally, since intermediaries internalize the rollover risk of carry trades
in our models, long-term assets with greater safety and liquidity such as
government bonds, collateralized assets, and other ﬁxed-income securities,
become more attractive havens for carry trades, and the more liquid these
assets are, the greater is the ex-ante crowding out of real investment.
LT investors can invest
We could assume that in addition to holding LT assets, LT investors have
access to eﬃcient investment opportunities similar to that of entrepreneurs.
This would not aﬀect the analysis. Again, as long as banks or/and depositors
earn some surplus from carry trades, then carry trades would crowd out these
eﬃcient investments as well.
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3.3 Interpretation and Implications
Interpretation of A ≥ y: Shadow Banking
We interpret condition (8) as essentially stating that maturity/liquidity trans-
formation by the ﬁnancial system—short-term borrowing against long-term
assets—is not constrained by prudential regulation, i.e., a large quantity of
long-term assets (in the global economy) can be potentially funded with
short-term claims (of a given economy). The public sector could in princi-
ple control carry-trade activity by banks by means of appropriate prudential
rules. Assuming away such a binding regulation in the United States is in
line with the gradual evolution of an important shadow banking system that
by 2007 was larger than the traditional banking system, and that was not
subject to such rules.
In line with our theory, the shadow banking system in the presence of
stricter macro-prudential regulation since 2007 has sharply contracted, but
the carry trades appear to have moved over to asset management industry
ﬂows into (i) junk bonds and collateralized leveraged loans (Stein, 2014),
(ii) emerging market government and corporate bonds (Feroli et al. 2014
and IMF, 2014), facilitating implicitly carry trades by these governments
and corporations (Bruno and Shin, 2014, and Acharya and Vij, 2016); and,
(iii) funding of residential mortgage-backed assets by real estate investment
trusts (REITs) using short-term repo (sale and repurchase agreements), as
discussed in Stein (2013). IMF GFSR (2016) documents that the presence of
such a “risk-taking channel” in the non-bank ﬁnance (insurance companies,
pension funds, and asset managers) implies that monetary policy remains
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potent in aﬀecting economic outcomes—we argue, in potentially unintended
and harmful ways—even when banks face strict macroeconomic regulation.
Crowding out by “carry trades”
Our setup predicts several of the stylized facts described in the introduction
(Furman, 2015, 2016). Suppose that p is large and q small, other things
being equal, i.e., carry trades face low rollover risk. Then 1−ρΛ is large and
crowding out is important:
(1) There is limited real investment by entrepreneurs and the marginal
return to real sector capital is high in equilibrium;
(2) It is likely that the reﬁnanced asset pays oﬀ before a liquidity crisis
(in which many banks become excluded from trading and get distressed).
At this payoﬀ date, the carry accrues to banks: The return on shareholder
capital is high due to high payouts but carries the rollover risk.16
Note that if banks and LT investors were splitting the surplus from carry
trades, then payouts by banks would be smaller but there would be an initial
boom in asset prices from LT assets at date 0.
Malinvestment
The mechanism that leads ineﬃcient carry trades to arise and crowd out
investment closely relates to the old notion of “malinvestment that is promi-
nent in Austrian economics (Hayek, 1931, and von Mises, 1949, for example).
16An alternative interpretation of this payout is in the form of issuance of bonds by
corporations to engage in shareholder buy-backs without undertaking signiﬁcant real in-
vestment. In other words, corporations can themselves engage in “carry trades” by tapping
into bond markets, a ﬁnancial “arbitrage” of sorts that creates value for shareholders on
its own.
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The distortion of the real interest rate due to monetary easing may subsi-
dize activities that are not socially desirable, e.g., excessive lending to the
housing sector, but become privately proﬁtable for banks due to the (socially
ineﬃcient) maturity transformation they oﬀer, at the expense of more desir-
able investments such as loans to the real sector. Whereas rent extraction
through ineﬃcient maturity transformation or carry trades are a particularly
relevant and topical form of “malinvestment,” this distortion can and does
take other forms such as zombie lending by banks which we discuss next.
Zombie lending
Ineﬃcient speculation is not the only unintended consequence of monetary
easing that observers have pointed out in recent crises. In some contexts,
such as Japan in the 1990s following monetary easing by the Bank of Japan
(Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap, 2008, and Gianetti and Simonov, 2013), or
Italy and Spain after European Central Bank’s unconventional monetary pol-
icy actions in 2012 (Acharya, Eisert, Euﬁnger and Hirsch, 2015), the main
concern has rather been that of zombie lending—the reﬁnancing of highly
distressed borrowers in order to defer credit losses at the risk of amplifying
them down the road. It is straightforward to introduce this unintended con-
sequence of monetary easing in our setup. Suppose for example that banks
have legacy non-performing loans that can be either liquidated at date 0 or
reﬁnanced for one additional period, which creates an additional loss δ at
date 1 for each dollar of reﬁnancing. In other words, zombie lending is a
storage technology with return 1 − δ. Investing deposits in this technology
becomes appealing if the date-0 policy rate is lower than 1− δ. This creates
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deadweight losses and crowding out of productive investment very much in
the same way as in the case of maturity transformation or carry trades.17
3.4 Optimal monetary policy
We thus far studied the situation in which the public sector naively sets
the date-0 policy rate at the level ρ that is optimal absent opportunistic
behavior by the ﬁnancial sector. We now study optimal monetary policy in
the presence of such behavior. Note ﬁrst that it is clearly optimal to maintain
the policy rate r∗ = 1 at all dates other than 0. Any attempt at aﬀecting
date-0 carry-trades incentives by committing to diﬀerent rates at dates t ≥ 1
distorts investment at these dates. It is therefore strictly more eﬃcient to
aﬀect carry-trade incentives with the date-0 rate only. The public sector thus
faces a static problem and its ability to commit is immaterial.
We characterize the optimal date-0 policy rate. It is obviously equal to
ρ when carry trades are not proﬁtable because ρ(1 + Λ) ≥ 1. Consider now
the interesting case in which ρ(1 + Λ) < 1. The date-0 investment in the
productive technology I is not monotonic in the date-0 interest rate r set by
the public sector (see Figure 1 for an illustration). For r ∈ (1/(1 +Λ),+∞),
the private sector does not enter into carry trades and I is a decreasing
function of r given by
f ′(I) = r. (12)
Otherwise, there is carry-trade activity and I is an increasing function of
17Indeed, Acharya, Eisert, Euﬁnger and Hirsch (2015) document a rise in borrowing
costs for non-zombie ﬁrms in Italy and Spain since 2012.
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r implicitly deﬁned by
f ′(I) = 1− rΛ, (13)
because a higher interest rate makes carry trades less attractive relative to
productive investment. Thus the optimal rate set by the public sector is
1/(1 + Λ) > ρ, because it yields the highest possible level of investment in
the productive technology, which is still lower than the ﬁrst-best level. To
sum up,
Proposition 3. (Optimal interest rate) If ρ(1+Λ) ≥ 1, then the optimal
policy rate is ρ which implements the ﬁrst-best date-0 investment level.
Otherwise, the optimal policy rate is 1/(1+Λ), leading to a smaller second-
best level of date-0 productive investment. At a rate lower than this optimal
rate, socially ineﬃcient carry trades crowd out productive investment leading
to an even lower investment level at date 0.
Proof. See discussion above. 
Lack of transmission of monetary policy
An important manifestation of the crowding-out eﬀect of carry trades high-
lighted in Figure 1 is that once interest rate is low enough for their returns
to be proﬁtable (r < 1/(1 + Λ)), the transmission of monetary policy to the
real sector breaks down. Not only do further reductions in interest rates not
get passed onto as lower corporate lending rates by the ﬁnancial sector, in
fact the lending rates rise with such reductions as the carry trade returns in-
crease and intermediaries equate the marginal lending rate to these returns.
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An interesting corollary is that optimal interest rate in the carry-trade re-
gion (second case of Proposition 3) is one up to which monetary easing is
transmitted one for one to the corporate lending rates and below which trans-
mission reverses (or more generally, becomes weaker). The optimal interest
rate is also the one below which there would be a growth in shadow bank-
ing, i.e., a surge in the creation of private money by intermediaries in the
form of short-term deposit-like claims (crowding out public money) to engage
in maturity transformation in unregulated or weakly regulated parts of the
ﬁnancial sector. If undertaken on traditional banking balance-sheets, then
the optimal interest rate is the one below which banking sector growth is
driven by non-traditional banking: growth in carry trades at the expense of
real-sector lending.
4 Endogenous liquidity and optimal lending
of last resort
Finally, we endogenize the cost 1+λ that banks incur when forced to liquidate
the LT asset. We suppose that this cost is determined by the public sector
acting as lender of last resort: It is the rate at which the public sector is
willing to lend against these LT assets.
Formally, the public sector now sets two interest rates. The ﬁrst one,
the only rate that we considered thus far, is the interest rate at which public
bonds trade. We deem it the “policy” rate, now denoted rP .
18 The second one
18It is easy to see that it is still optimal to set this policy rate to 1 at all dates other
than 0.
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Date-0 rate 
Date-0 investment 
A rate decrease spurs investment without 
affecting carry-trade activity 
A rate decrease spurs carry trades that crowd 
out investment 
Figure 1: Entrepreneurial investment is not monotonic in the policy rate. 
1
1 + Λ
f ′−1
(
1
1 + Λ
)
< I0
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is the rate at which the public sector is willing to lend against LT assets, and
we deem it the “lending-of-last-resort (LOLR)” rate, denoted rL. These two
rates are a stylized summary of monetary policies that consist in controlling
both short-term nominal rates and the conditions under which each asset
class is admissible collateral for the central bank.
Unlike in Section 3.4, the public sector now faces an intertemporal prob-
lem. We suppose that it can fully commit to a policy (rP , rL).
Absent any commitment problem nor any other ingredient in the model,
the public sector would easily implement the ﬁrst-best by committing to
rP = ρ, and to a suﬃciently high LOLR rate rL that discourages carry trades
in the ﬁrst place.19 Since banks use public reﬁnancing only for the socially
bad reason that they have entered into carry trades, such a high LOLR rate
would come at no cost in equilibrium. We now consider a more interesting
situation in which banks also have socially good reasons to resort to public
reﬁnancing, so that the public sector faces a trade-oﬀ when determining the
liquidity of LT assets through its LOLR policy.
4.1 Optimal lending of last resort
We now suppose that, from date 1 on, banks may receive a proﬁtable oppor-
tunity to lend against LT assets. The arrival rate of this opportunity is σ
(strictly) before the LT asset pays oﬀ, and 0 afterwards. This opportunity
requires an investment l and generates a payoﬀ l+d at the date at which the
LT asset pays oﬀ. There are several possible interpretations for this oppor-
tunity. First, it may be construed as the ﬁnancing of a subset of LT investors
19The LOLR rate must satisfy ρ[1 + (rL − 1)/(1 + pq/1− p)] ≥ 1.
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against some of their assets if these agents have a preference shock and put
a premium d/l on current consumption at the arrival date. Alternatively,
it may be that a maintenance investment of l is required in order to avoid
a reduction d in the LT asset’s payoﬀ. The public sector does not observe
whether and when this opportunity arrives and thus cannot condition its
policy on it.
For simplicity, we suppose in this section that
f(x) = log x (14)
and impose parameter restrictions:
ρ
(
l + d
l
)
< 1, (15)
l ≤ dy
l + d
. (16)
We will explain the respective roles of these restrictions in due course.
A trade-oﬀ now arises as a higher LOLR rate rL makes a low date-0
policy rate rP more conducive to entrepreneurial investment by discouraging
carry trades, but may eliminate such socially desirable ex-post investment
opportunities. This leads to the existence of two locally optimal policies
(rP , rL):
Proposition 4. (Optimal policies) There are two locally optimal policies
(rP , rL). First, an aggressive policy leads to optimal date-0 investment but
comes at the cost of a strict LOLR policy that eliminates eﬃcient subsequent
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lending. Formally, it consists in setting
rP = ρ, (17)
rL > 1 +
1− ρ
ρ
[
1 +
p
(1− p)q
]
. (18)
The second one, more conservative, is such that
rP =
l
l + d
> ρ, (19)
rL = 1 +
d
l
[
1 +
p
(1− p)q
]
, (20)
which leads to a suboptimal level of entrepreneurial investment at date 0 but
maintains the socially desirable subsequent loans backed by the LT asset.
The former aggressive policy is preferable to the latter conservative one if
and only if:
log
[
ρ(l + d)
l
]
<
ρ(l + d)
l
− 1− ρσ(1− p)d
σ(1− p) + p. (21)
Condition (21) shows that the aggressive policy is globally optimal when
ρσ(1 − p)d/[σ(1 − p) + p] is suﬃciently small holding ρ(l + d)/l) constant .
This is so when σ or/and 1−p are suﬃciently small other things being equal,
or, when the ex-ante cost of an ex-post ineﬃcient LOLR policy is suﬃciently
small.
Proof. The banks’ subsequent lending opportunity has a private positive
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NPV if and only if
l + d ≥ l
[
1 +
rL − 1
1 + p
(1−p)q
]
. (22)
Condition (15) implies that if rL satisﬁes this condition, then it is not possible
to implement the investment level I0 at date 0 because setting the policy
rate at ρ would induce carry trades. There are therefore two local optima.
The public sector may seek to reach entrepreneurial investment I0 at date
0, in which case it must set rP = ρ and rL suﬃciently large to discourage
carry trades (as given in (18)). Alternatively, the public sector may pick the
lowest rate rL at which banks invest l after date 1 whenever they have a
chance, given by (20), which imposes rP as given by (19) from Proposition
3. Condition (16) ensures that banks can raise enough funds from savers to
ﬁnance this lending opportunity l when it occurs as well as the optimal unit
loan to entrepreneurs.
Finally, (21) simply stems from noting that entrepreneurs invest 1/rP
when the date-0 policy rate is rP and from re-arranging the condition:
log
(
1
ρ
)
ρ
− 1
ρ
>
log
(
l+d
l
)
ρ
− l + d
l
+
σ(1− p)d
σ(1− p) + p. (23)

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4.2 Quantitative easing as a crowding-out strategy
The aggressive policy in Proposition 4 admits an alternative interpretation in
terms of quantitative easing. Suppose that the public sector cannot commit
to a LOLR rate other than, say, rL = 1. The public sector can then purchase
at date 0 a cash ﬂow Q generated by the LT asset such that
Q ≥ A+ I0 − y. (24)
This eliminates the crowding out of entrepreneurial investment by carry
trades by ensuring that the marginal entrepreneurial loan cannot be alterna-
tively directed towards carry trades. The only remaining social cost of carry
trades stems from the expected costs of ﬁnancial distress for the carry trades
that are backed by the assets left in the market.
Such a large-scale asset purchase can be ﬁnanced either by taxation or by
issuance of short-term debt. This latter arrangement closely matches, within
our model, the one advocated by Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2016), who
argue that the central bank should “crowd out” the issuance of short-term
debt by the ﬁnancial sector by maintaining a large balance-sheet of gov-
ernment bonds funded by savers in the economy. In Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) too, private money and public money are substi-
tutes: short-term debt issuance by the ﬁnancial sector to meet the demand
for safe assets by households renders them fragile, which is not the case if
this demand is met by public debt issuance. Similarly, in our model, carry
trades by the public sector crowd out carry trades by the private sector and
can be desirable from a ﬁnancial stability standpoint.
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This rationale for QE has the interesting implication that large-scale as-
set purchases are most eﬃcient when they withdraw assets that would lend
themselves to carry trades from the market. In particular, QE strategies that
consist in swapping assets, in particular illiquid or long-term ones for more
liquid/shorter-lived ones, such as operations “twist” would be counterproduc-
tive here as they would raise the proﬁtability of carry trades and thus lead
to more crowding out of entrepreneurial investment.20 This implication is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
that Federal Reserve actions to purchase mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
from markets had a more favorable market reaction than operations “twist.”
Consistently, Darmouni and Rodnyansky (2016) document that while the
Fed purchases of MBS resulted in a transmission to the real sector in the
form of bank lending, operations “twist” did not.
5 Concluding remarks
Our attempt in this paper has been to embed ﬁnancial stability concerns in
workhorse monetary policy models. In particular, we introduced the follow-
ing tension in a monetary policy model with nominal rigidities: monetary
easing, not only lowers the cost of capital for ﬁrms, but also subsidizes in-
eﬃcient maturity transformation by ﬁnancial intermediaries—“carry trades”
that borrow cheap at the short-term against illiquid long-term assets. Op-
timal monetary policy trades oﬀ any stimulative gains against the costs of
carry trades from rollover risk faced by the ﬁnancial sector from undertak-
20Caballero and Farhi (2016) reach similar conclusions regarding the eﬃciency of asset
swaps albeit for diﬀerent reasons.
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ing carry trades and the crowding out of real investments. The model helps
understand the puzzle raised by Furman (2015, 2016) as to why low nominal
rates have been associated with low investment and high marginal returns
to real capital while generating at the same time high returns to shareholder
capital.
There are many directions in which we could extend our analysis fruit-
fully. One, we assumed that long-term assets are held by long-term investors
and ﬁnancial intermediaries lend against these by borrowing short-term, cap-
turing in the process some or all of the long-term assets’ returns. In general,
there may be sales of some of these assets to ﬁnancial intermediaries as well
as the creation of new such long-term assets. Endogenizing ex-ante asset
prices of long-term assets when carry trades are proﬁtable is a promising di-
rection to develop a theory of asset-price inﬂation and bubble-burst patterns
arising as a ﬁnancial-sector response to monetary easing.
Second, we could introduce uncertainty to real-sector output or to pref-
erence shocks over time whereby monetary easing may continue for several
periods and then be tightened at the cost of unwinding of ﬁnancial sector
carry-trades. Carry trades would then potentially build up in the economy
over an extended period of monetary easing and face abrupt rollover risk
when rates rise. Adding such a feature to the model would allow us to re-
late in a better fashion to phenomena in asset markets and ﬁnancial ﬂows as
observed during the “taper tantrum” in 2013 (Feroli et al. 2014).
Finally, our model relied on moral hazard (opportunistic behavior) in-
duced by monetary easing as a way of generating carry trades in equilib-
rium. Implicitly, we assumed that the central bank cannot perfectly observe
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and rule out ineﬃcient maturity transformation or carry trades by the ﬁnan-
cial sector. It is straightforward to consider an alternative adverse-selection
framework in which there are two types of ﬁnancial intermediaries: one, that
only lends to the productive real sector, and another, that has excess to the
carry-trade technology. We conjecture that this model with adverse selection
would have implications broadly similar to the ones under moral hazard: op-
timal monetary policy under adverse selection uses higher interest rates or
tightening to screen out the second type of ﬁnancial intermediaries by making
carry trades unattractive.
References
Acharya, Viral V. 2015. “Financial Stability in the Broader Man-
date for Central Banks: A Political Economy Perspective.” Brookings’
Hutchins Center Working Paper Series.
Acharya, Viral V., Tim Eisert, Christian Euﬁnger, and Chris-
tian Hirsch. 2015. “Whatever it Takes: The Real Eﬀects of Un-
conventional Monetary Policy.” Working Paper, NYU Stern School of
Business.
Acharya, Viral V., and Hassan Naqvi. 2012a. “The Seeds of a
Crisis: A Theory of Bank Liquidity and Risk Taking over the Business
Cycle.” Journal of Financial Economics 106 (2): 349–366.
Acharya, Viral V., and Hassan Naqvi. 2012b. “Bank Liquidity
and Bubbles: Why Central Banks Should Lean against Liquidity.” In
39
New Perspectives on Asset Price Bubbles: Theory, Evidence and Pol-
icy, edited by Douglas Evanoﬀ, George Kaufman and A.G. Malliaris.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Acharya, Viral V. and Siddharth Vij. 2016. “External Com-
mercial Borrowings of Corporations as Carry Trades: Evidence from
India.” Working Paper, New York University Stern School of Business.
Benmelech, Efraim and Nittai K. Bergman. 2012. “Credit
Traps”. American Economic Review 102 (6): 3004–32.
Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Yann Koby. 2016. “The “Rever-
sal Interest Rate”: An Eﬀective Lower Bound on Monetary Policy.”
Working paper, Princeton University.
Bruno, Valentina and Hyun-Song Shin. 2014. “Global Dollar
Credit and Carry Trades: A Firm-level Analysis.” Review of Financial
Studies. Forthcoming.
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Emmanuel Farhi. 2016. “The Safety
Trap,” Working Paper, Harvard University.
Caballero, Ricardo J., Takeo Hoshi and Anil K. Kashyap. 2008.
“Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan.” American
Economic Review 98 (5): 1943–77.
Darmouni, Alexander and Oliver Rodnyansky. 2016. “The Ef-
fects of Quantitative Easing on Bank Lending Behavior.” Working Pa-
per, Columbia Business School.
40
Diamond, Douglas W. 1997. “Liquidity, Banks, and Markets.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 105 (5): 928–56.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Raghuram G. Rajan. 2012. “Illiq-
uid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy.” Journal of
Political Economy 120 (3): 552–591.
Drechsler, Itamar, Philipp Schnabl, and Alexi Savov. 2016.
“A Model of Monetary Policy and Risk Premia,” Journal of Finance.
Forthcoming.
Eggertsson, Gauti, and Michael Woodford. 2003. “The Zero
Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy.” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity. 2003(1): 139–211.
Farhi, Emmanuel, and Jean Tirole. 2012. “Collective Moral Haz-
ard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts.” American Economic
Review. 102 (1): 60–93.
Feroli, Michael, Anil K. Kashyap, Kermit Schoenholtz, and
Hyun Song Shin. 2014. “Market Tantrums and Monetary Policy.”
U.S. Monetary Policy Forum.
Furman, Jason. 2015. “Business Investment in the United States:
Facts, Explanations, Puzzles, and Policies.” Council of Economic Ad-
visers. Remarks at the Progressive Policy Institute.
Furman, Jason. 2016. “Productivity, Inequality, and Economic
Rents.” http://www.regblog.org/2016/06/13/furman-productivity-inequality-
and-economic-rents/.
41
Giannetti, Mariassunta and Andrei Simonov. 2013. “On the
Real Eﬀects of Bank Bailouts: Micro Evidence from Japan.” American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5 (1): 135–67.
Greenwood, Robin, Samuel G. Hanson, and Jeremy C. Stein.
2016. “The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability
Tool.” Paper presented at the Designing Resilient Monetary Policy
Frameworks for the Future Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Sym-
posium, Jackson Hole, WY.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1931. Prices and Production. New York: Au-
gustus M. Kelley Publishers.
International Monetary Fund. 2014. “Emerging Market Volatility:
Lessons from the Taper Tantrum,” Staﬀ Discussion Note, September
2014.
International Monetary Fund. 2016. “Monetary Policy and the
Rise of Nonbank Finance.” In Global Financial Stability Report, Octo-
ber 2016.
Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. 2011.
“The Eﬀects of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and
Implications for Policy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. 2015.
“The impact of Treasury supply on ﬁnancial sector lending and stabil-
ity.” Journal of Financial Economics. 118(3), 571–600.
42
Mises, Ludwig von. 1949. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics.
Chapter XX, Section 8. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rajan, Raghuram G. 2013. “A Step in the Dark: Unconventional
Monetary Policy after the Crisis.” Andrew Crockett Memorial Lecture,
Bank for International Settlements.
Stein, Jeremy C. 2012. “Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Reg-
ulation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (1): 57–95.
Stein, Jeremy C. 2013. “Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins,
Measurement, and Policy Responses.” Speech delivered at the “Restor-
ing Household Financial Stability after the Great Recession: Why
Household Balance Sheets Matter” research symposium sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri.
Stein, Jeremy C. 2014. Comments on Feroli, Michael, Anil K.
Kashyap, Kermit Schoenholtz, and Hyun Song Shin, “Market Tantrums
and Monetary Policy.” U.S. Monetary Policy Forum.
Wiederholt, Mirko. 2015. “Empirical Properties of Inﬂation Expec-
tations and the Zero Lower Bound.” Working paper.
43
Online Appendix: Extensions
E.1 Sketch of a nominal model
We leave the entrepreneurs unchanged but now assume that savers
consume both when young and old. The cohort of savers that is born
at date t has quasi-linear preferences
u(ct) + ct+1, (E.1)
where u is diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and concave. Savers are en-
dowed with L units of labor at birth that they supply inelastically when
young to competitive ﬁrms that transform one unit of labor into one
unit of the “nume´raire” good (which no longer serves as nume´raire). We
suppose that savers value only the output produced by entrepreneurs
of their own cohort, and so they do not seek to consume the output
produced when they are young.
All agents use a common currency as unit of account. The public sector
sets the nominal interest rate, issues one-period bonds, and taxes old
households.
Steady-state
Suppose that prices are ﬂexible. No-arbitrage then implies that the
“nume´raire” good and the output have the same price at all dates given
that they are perfect substitutes, and that this price also corresponds
to the wage.
We posit that the public sector seeks to achieve a constant rate of
inﬂation that we normalize to 1. We denote rt+1 and it+1 the respective
real and nominal gross interest rates between t and t+ 1, and πt+1 the
gross rate of inﬂation over this period. Under perfect coordination
between ﬁscal and monetary policies, the public sector can attain a
constant price level together with a given path of real rates {rt}t∈N
by combining an interest-feedback rule, open-market operations, and
taxes on old households as follows. The interest-rate rule is a standard
Taylor rule:
it+1 = rt+1π
Φ
t , (E.2)
with Φ > 1. Rule (E.2) together with the Euler equation it+1 = rt+1πt+1
deﬁnes a linear diﬀerence equation for the logarithm of inﬂation that
has a unique non-exploding solution equal to 0 at all dates.
The public sector then imposes a real rate rt+1 by issuing at date t a
claim to yt+1 − It+1 due next date, where {yt+1; It+1} solves:
u′(L− yt+1) = rt+1, (E.3)
f ′(It+1) = rt+1, (E.4)
where we suppose that u is such that the solution to this system exists
and satisﬁes yt+1 > It+1. At the prevailing rate rt+1, savers save a
total amount yt+1 at date t, lending It+1 to date-t entrepreneurs and
investing the residual in public bonds.
Finally, a lump-sum tax rt(yt − It) − yt+1 + It+1 on old households at
date t+ 1 balances the budget of the public sector.
It is straightforward to check that, as in the body of the paper, the
optimal interest rate has the “golden-rule” value of one in the steady-
state.
Whereas a full-ﬂedged treatment of monetary easing and ﬁnancial in-
stability in this nominal model is beyond the scope of this appendix,
we can oﬀer the following sketch.
Monetary easing
We suppose that entrepreneurs born at date 0 experience pessimistic
“animal spirits,” and wrongly believe that the date-1 price level for
their output will be ρ < 1. This is the only date-0 shock: Unlike in
the body of the paper, we assume constant preferences. The two goods
still remain perfect substitutes at date 1. Savers who set the price level
through their Euler equation have correct expectations.
Keeping the price level at one, the public sector can target a real rate
r1 < 1 between dates 0 and 1 by issuing claims to date-1 consumption
y′ − I ′, where {y′; I ′} solves:
u′(L− y′) = r1, (E.5)
ρf ′(I) = r1. (E.6)
The optimal rate r1 depends then on the weight that the social welfare
function puts on savers and entrepreneurs as it trades oﬀ productive
eﬃciency (r1 = ρ) and eﬃcient consumption/savings decisions (u
′ = 1).
Monetary easing and ﬁnancial instability
The introduction, as in the body of the paper, of banks and LT investors
with a constant intertemporal rate of substitution raises the issue that
it is unclear which Euler equation, theirs or that of the savers, pins
down inﬂation. A full-ﬂedged nominal model should address this. If
one assumes that savers pin down inﬂation, then the condition under
which monetary easing triggers carry trades is identical to that in the
body of the paper (1 − r0(1 + Λ) < 1). The only diﬀerence with the
main model is that the public sector has an additional strategy that
can be optimal: lowering the interest rate below the optimal level in
the absence of carry trades. This can reduce the size of the carry trade
by spurring date-0 households’ consumption.
E.2 Surplus-sharing between banks and
long-term investors
If a bank reﬁnances a unit LT claim held by a LT investors by rolling
over deposits starting at date 0, then the bank and the selling LT
investors share a surplus 1−ρ(1+Λ). The price at which banks purchase
such LT claims from LT investors regulate how they split this surplus.
Suppose that a bank can purchase a unit claim at date 0 at a price 1+x,
where x ∈ [0, 1/[ρ(1+Λ)]−1]. Such an x could be further endogenized
with a full-ﬂedged model of imperfect competition between banks and
LT investors (e.g., matching). The body of the paper studies the case
in which x = 0.
Inequality (8) suﬃces to ensure that a bank always has the option to
use its deposits in a carry trade. In this case, the hurdle rate on real
investment is 1/(1+x)−ρΛ, and entrepreneurs’ demand for loans I(x),
increasing in x, solves
f ′(I(x)) =
1
1 + x
− ρΛ, (E.7)
and the deposits invested in carry trades are
y − I(x). (E.8)
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